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We study the dispersion in rates of provincial economic- and TFP growth in China.  Our 
results show that regional growth patterns can be understood as a function of several 
interrelated factors, which include investment in physical capital, human capital, and 
infrastructure capital; the infusion of new technology and its regional spread; and market 
reforms, with a major step forward occurring following Deng Xiaoping’s “South Trip” in 
1992.  We find that FDI had much larger effect on TFP growth before 1994 than after, 
and we attribute this to emergence of other channels of technology transfer when 
marketization accelerated.  We find that human capital positively affects output per 
worker and productivity growth.  In particular, in terms of its direct contribution to 
production, educated labor has a much higher marginal product.  Moreover, we estimate a 
positive, direct effect of human capital on TFP growth.  This direct effect is hypothesized 
to come from domestic innovation activities.  The estimated spillover effect of human 
capital on TFP growth is positive and statistically significant, which is very robust to 
model specifications and estimation methods.  The spillover effect appears to be much 
stronger before 1994.  We conduct cost-benefit analysis and a policy “experiment,” in 
which we project the impact increases in human capital and infrastructure capital on 
regional inequality.  We conclude that investing in human capital will be an effective 
policy to reduce regional gaps in China as well as an efficient means to promote 
economic growth. 
 
JEL Codes:  O15 O18 O47 O53 
Keyword:   Regional Inequality, China, Human Capital, Foreign Direct Investment, 
Spillovers, Technology Transmission 
 
   1
1.  Introduction 
Although it is generally believed that human capital plays an important role in 
economic growth, studies about the effect of education on growth based on cross-country 
data have produced surprisingly mixed results (Krueger 1995, Pritchett 2001, Temple 
2001, Islam 1995, Benhabib and Spiegel 1994, Mankiw et. al. 1992, and Barro 1991). 
One reason for this uncertainty is that the impact of education has varied widely across 
countries because of very different institutions, labor markets and education quality 
(Temple 1999, Pritchett 2001), making it hard to identify an average effect.  This paper 
reports research on the role of human capital, infrastructure capital, and foreign 
investment on economic growth in China.  We investigate the role of educated workers in 
the production process itself, as well as on total factor productivity (TFP) growth.  We 
believe the results have important implications for an understanding of economic growth 
in general as well as for factors contributing to China’s rapidly rising regional inequality.   
China’s dramatic economic growth since the beginning of economic reform in 
1978, along with wide regional disparities in growth rates, provides a very important and 
useful episode to analyze for the effects of human capital on growth.  By the year 2000, 
China found itself with one of the highest degrees of income inequality in the world 
(Yang, 2002).  Regional economic inequality is a relatively new phenomenon in China’s 
last half century.  From the beginning of the Mao era through early 1990’s, inequality (as 
measured by the coefficient of variation among four regions’ per-capita nominal gross 
domestic product) across major regions trended downward.  However, this measure of 
inequality rose sharply in the decade of the 1990s (Figure 1).
1   
Figure 2 illustrates the trends in regional inequality in China using the ratio of per 
capita GDP between the three non-coastal regions and the coastal region.  The industrial 
northeast, where per capita gross domestic product substantially exceeded that in the 
                                                 
1 The four regions defined in this study are: coastal (Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, 
Fujian, Shandong, and Guangdong-Hainan); northeast (Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning), interior (Shanxi, 
Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangxi, Sichuan-Chongqing, Guizhou, Yunnan, and Shaanxi) and 
far west (Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, and Xinjiang). 
 We have excluded Xizang (Tibet) and Inner Mongolia 
provinces due to lack of data, combined Chongqing with Sichuan and Hainan with Guangdong.  The 
division of the four regions is based on the results of past research and our own judgment regarding the 
major economic and geographical clusters that characterize distinct “clubs” of economic growth and 
development in China.  
   2
coastal region at the end of the Mao era experienced a sharp reversal so that by 2003, its 
standing relative to the coast had fallen to 30 percent less than the coast.  The coast’s 
advantage over the interior and far west had grown to a ratio of approximately 2.4 by 
2003.  By comparison, among the major regions of the United States in 2004, the ratio of 
the highest to lowest regional per-capita GDP was only 1.32 (United States Bureau of 
Economic Analysis, current web site).  In China in the year 2003, the ratio of real per-
capita GDP between the wealthiest province and the poorest was 8.65, while in India for 
2002, the comparable ratio (in nominal terms) was only 4.6 (Networkindia).
2   
A body of research has shown that total factor productivity (TFP) growth has 
played an important role in post-reform growth in China (Chow 1993, Borensztein & 
Ostry 1996, Young 2003, Wang and Yao 2003, and Islam et all 2006), but they do not 
explicitly model the role of human capital in the production function or its role in 
explaining TFP growth.  It is widely hypothesized that human capital has a direct role in 
production through the generation of worker skills and also an indirect role through the 
facilitation of technology spillovers.  However, such effects and especially their impacts 
on regional inequality in China have not been fully analyzed.  In published papers, Chen 
and Fleisher (1996), Fleisher and Chen (1997) and Démurger (2001) provide evidence 
that education at the secondary or college level helps to explain differences in provincial 
growth rates.  Liu (2007b, 2007c) demonstrates important external effects of human 
capital on productivity in rural and urban China.  This paper provides a framework and 
evidence expanding our understanding the role of human capital in production and in 
TFP growth in China.   
It is important to note that, as Fleisher (2005) and Heckman (2005) have noted, 
China’s investment in human capital at the level of education beyond the secondary level 
until very recently has been very small in comparison with nations at similar levels of per 
capita income and economic development, and its geographical dispersion has been large.  
In 2004, the government expenditures on education were 2.79% of GDP and had been 
below 3% in most years since 1992, much lower than the average of 5.1% in developed 
countries.  As showing in Table 1, the proportion of college graduates in the population 
                                                 
2http://networkindia.iesingapore.com/inn/news/index.cfm?fuseaction=viewContent&Cat=10&ID=804&vie
wmonth=6-2005   3
was 0.4% in 1982 and had risen to only 1.7% by 1992.  Starting in 1999, the Chinese 
government increased expenditures sharply, and the enrollment of college students 
increased 43%, and the average annual growth rate between 1999 and 2003 was 29%.  
However, by 2003, the proportion of college graduates in the national population was still 
very low, at 5.2%.  The proportion of college graduates in the coastal, far west, and 
northeast regions exceeded 6% in 2003, while in the interior (with nearly 52% of the 
national population) it was only 4.2%.  For high-school graduates and above, the 
proportion in the population was approximately 43% in the coastal region, 53% in the 
northeast and only about 38% in the far west and interior regions.    
China’s economic marketization, both internally and with respect to the outside 
world, has been protracted, with alternating periods of gradualism, stagnation, and sharp 
jumps.
3  Marketization has required and been reinforced by transformation (still 
incomplete) of the structure of business and commercial law.  The associated introduction 
of foreign ownership through foreign direct investment (FDI) is one of the most likely 
contributors to economic growth in China.  The role of FDI has received much attention 
because of its potential for bringing in new technology, with its attendant spillovers, both 
technical and managerial (Liu, 2007a.  See Cheung and Lin, 2003 for a thorough analysis 
and references to earlier literature.).  FDI has facilitated emergence of the non-state-
owned sector as foreign investors have become partners in formerly state-owned 
enterprises.  The direction of FDI is obviously encouraged by exogenous geographical 
and political factors such as proximity to major ports, decisions to create special 
economic zones and free trade areas, and new ownership forms.  In addition, the 
profitability of FDI is expected to depend on local taxation policies, local expenditures on 
infrastructure, schools, etc, and by labor-market conditions.  There is likely to be a degree 
of endogeneity in these relationships (Li and Liu, 2005).  One of the major features of our 
research is to incorporate the endogeneity of FDI in a model explaining China’s increased 
regional economic disparity. 
Still another major source of growth has been investment in infrastructure capital.  
At the beginning of reform, transportation and communications infrastructure were poor, 
                                                 
3 The slow pace of China’s transformation has distinguished it from most other formerly planned 
economies, especially those of Central and Eastern Europe and the much of the former Soviet Union 
(Fleisher, Sabirianova, and Wang, 2005).   4
but governments at various levels have invested heavily in the construction of highways, 
expansion of rail systems, and development of electronic communications facilities.  
Neglect of the marketization process, opening to the outside world, and investment in 
infrastructure capital would lead to an incomplete, and probably biased, understanding of 
the role of human capital, because local human capital stock is likely to be correlated 
with those factors.
4   
Another aspect of China’s transformation that cannot be neglected is its uneven 
pace.  It is generally agreed that a sharp acceleration in China’s gradual “growth out of 
the plan” (Naughton, 1995) followed Deng Xiaoping’s famous 1992 “South Trip.  
Although urban economic reform began in the period 1983-85, the Chinese economy was 
still largely a command economy under the old planning system, with the share of state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) accounting for more than half of gross industrial output.  After 
Deng’s visit to south China, the country moved much more quickly towards an open, 
market economy.  In the period 1992 to 1994, the share of SOEs in industrial output 
dropped 14 percentage points (from 48.1% to 34.1%), an annual rate over three times as 
rapid as during the period 1978 to 1992.  The SOE share in industrial output fell to 13% 
by 2003.   
The year 1994 marked the beginning of withdrawal of government subsidies for 
loss-incurring SOE’s, and this hardening of budget constraints  became much more 
earnest in 1997 (Appleton et al., 2002).  There was also a shift toward fiscal federalism 
after 1994 that, through separating central and local government taxation and relaxing 
ties between provincial and sub-provincial treasuries and the center, reinforced 
imposition of hard budget constraints on SOEs (Ma and Norregaard, 1998; Su and Zhao, 
2004; Qian and Weingast, 1997).  By making the direct costs of subsidizing provincial- 
and sub-provincial-owned state enterprises much more direct drains on local government 
treasuries, the fiscal reform provided strong incentives for the local governments to shift 
their expenditures from wasteful support of losing enterprises to expenditures on projects 
that would attract FDI, particularly infrastructure projects (Cao, Qian, and Weingast, 
1999).  Despite the potential contribution of these reforms to improved economic 
                                                 
4 Fleisher and Chen (1997) and Démurger (2001), among others, provide evidence of the importance of 
infrastructure investment for productivity and economic growth in China. 
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conditions, implementation was by no means perfect (Ma and Norregaard, 1998).  We 
account for the structural break in the course of market reforms in China in the 
specification of our empirical models.  
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows.  In section 2 we lay out our 
methodology.  Section 3 describes our data.  Section 4 reports our empirical results for 
aggregate production functions and TFP-growth models.  In section 5, we conduct cost-
benefit analysis by computing the rates of return to investment in human capital and 
telephone infrastructure.  In addition, we perform a hypothetical experiment by 
evaluating alternative investment strategies in reducing regional inequality.  Section 6 
concludes and provides policy recommendations.  The appendixes describe the 
construction of critical data series and provide details of mathematical derivations. 
 
2.  Methodology 
In order to explore the importance of human capital, we specify and estimate 
provincial aggregate production functions in which inputs are specified to include 
physical capital and two categories of labor: (i) workers who have attended up to some 
high school without graduating and (ii) workers who have acquired at least a high-school 
diploma.  The estimated output elasticities of the three inputs are used to calculate factor 
marginal products and also TFP.  This strategy permits us to investigate two possible 
channels through which human capital may influence output.  One channel is a direct 
effect, in that workers who have acquired at least a high-school diploma should have a 
higher marginal product than workers who have not achieved this level of schooling.  The 
second channel is indirect, through TFP growth. We hypothesize that provinces with a 
relatively large proportion of highly educated workers benefit from being able to use new 
production techniques and to benefit from technology spillovers from the provinces with 
the highest technology levels. 
The incorporation of a measure of human capital “inside” the production function 
is based on the micro-level evidence that workers with different educational attainment 
have different marginal products.  For example, in analysis of firm data for China, 
Fleisher and Wang (2001, 2004) and Fleisher, Hu, and Li (2006) find evidence that 
highly educated workers have significantly higher marginal products than workers with   6
lower levels of schooling.  Our inclusion of human capital measures inside the production 
function is not unique.  For example, Mankiw et al. (1992) have done so using aggregate 
data.  However, other researchers, such as Nelson and Phelps (1966), Islam (1995), 
Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) for example, suggest that human capital mainly operates 
through total factor productivity (TFP), because it facilitates the development and 
adaptation of new technology.  We adopt a mixture of these approaches to estimating the 
impact of investment in human capital on output and growth. 
  The production function including two types of labor is:
5       
   
ken i t u
it it it eit nit Y A K LLe
βββ =      (1) 
where Y is output, K is capital, Le is the number of workers with secondary education or 
above, Ln is the number of workers who have not graduated from high school, and u is a 
disturbance term, for province i= 1, 2, …, n from year t=1, 2, …, T.
6  The parameters βk, 
βe, and βn are the output elasticities of the corresponding inputs. 
In addition to its direct effect on output, human capital is believed to facilitate 
development and adoption of new technology, which is reflected in TFP.  Thus, we 
investigate those effects of education in a TFP growth model along with other factors 
generally hypothesized to impact TFP, including FDI and local infrastructure capital.  We 
first address the role of human capital.  Following Nelson and Phelps (1966), we 
postulate that the diffusion of technology is positively related to human capital.  Nelson 
and Phelps specify the growth rate of technology as 
 
*
()
tt t
tt
TFP TFP TFP
h
TFP TFP
& ⎡ ⎤ −
=Φ ⎢ ⎥
⎣ ⎦
,  (2)      
  (0) 0 Φ = ,         () 0 h ′ Φ >  
so that the growth rate of TFP is dependent on human capital (h) and the gap between its 
actual level and a hypothetical maximum level of TFP (
*
t TFP ).  The expression 
                                                 
5 Jones (2005) shows that the Cobb-Douglas form is a valid approximation in the aggregate for a variety of 
underlying micro firm production functions.  
6 An alternative measure of human capital is the number of workers with college education or above.  
Although we aggregate workers with at least high school diplomas in our estimation of the production 
function, we specify our TFP-growth equation to include only college graduates.  Our rationale for this is 
that TFP growth is a function, in part, of technology spillovers, and we postulate that college graduates 
have a more significant role to play in this regard than do those with lower levels of schooling.    7
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 represents the technology gap, and  () h Φ  represents the ability to adopt and 
adapt the technology, which is an increasing function of human capital (h).  Thus, the 
new technology developed by an advanced region can have spillover effects to the benefit 
of poorer regions.  Equation (2) describes the process of technological diffusion in what 
might be characterized as a learning-by-watching process.   
Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) extend Nelson and Phelps’ (1966) framework to 
include domestic innovation.  They specify TFP growth as a function of human capital, 
and human capital is modeled to have both a direct effect (innovation) and as well as an 
indirect spillover effect working through technological diffusion.  The indirect effect is 
captured by the interaction of human capital and the output gap:  
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where  max Y  is  the highest level of provincial output in the regions studied (e.g., provinces 
in China),  0 TFP  is total factor productivity in the initial year, c denotes the exogenous 
progress of technology,  i gh  represents domestic innovation, and  max [( )/ ] ii i mh Y Y Y −  
denotes technology diffusion.  Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) measure human capital ( i h ) 
by the average years of schooling.  g and m are parameters.   
  Our full model represents provincial TFP growth as a function of human capital, 
infrastructure capital, physical-capital vintage effects, foreign direct investment, and 
regional technology spillovers.  To capture the impact of a break in the reform process 
following Deng Xiao Ping’s “South Trip,” we impose a structural break in 1994 as 
follows: 
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(4)    
YB is a year dummy which is set to be 1 if before 1994.  As discussed previously, we 
measure human capital  i h  in the TFP-growth equation as the percentage of the population 
with at least college degrees. The variable  i y  denotes output per capita.    8
  We assume that the technology-spillover process is limited by frictions and costs 
positively associated with distance.  A region that is closer to the most advanced region is 
assumed to have better access to new technology than more distant regions.  To capture 
this effect, the output gap is discounted by the railway distance between the capital city of 
each province and the capital city in the province with the highest output per capita 
(which is typically Shanghai).  This distance variable is specified as  max_i d .  Thus, we 
define “Human-capital spillover variable” as: 
max,
max_
1
[( ) ]
ti t
it
ii t
yy
h
dy
−
. 
We include a variable representing foreign direct investment,  i RFDI , the ratio of 
real foreign direct investment to the total work force, which is assumed to represent the 
embodiment of foreign technology.  Finally, following Wolff (1991) and Nelson (1964) 
we include as an independent variable, the second difference in the ratio of physical 
capital, (
2
ti K ∆ ), to reflect the assumption that new capital embodies the most recent 
technology.  The dummy variables  1,i η  and  2,t η  represent provincial and annual fixed 
effects, respectively. 
A concern about i RFDI is endogeneity of foreign direct investment (Li and Liu, 
2005), because locations with higher TFP may offer higher investment returns.
7  Our use 
of two-period lagged RFDI in the regression equations should mitigate this effect, but if 
the error terms of the TFP growth model are serially correlated, it is still possible to have 
correlation between lagged RFDI and the contemporaneous errors in the model.  We thus 
use instrumental variable estimation to correct for this possibility. 
     
3.  Data 
Our data are from various years of the China Statistical Yearbook, Population 
Census (1983, 1993, and 2001), Annual Population Change Survey (State Statistical 
Bureau, 1996, 1998, 1999, 2002 and 2003), Hsueh, Li, and Liu (1993), Sylvie Démurger 
(personal communication), and Fu (2004). One important feature of this study is that our 
                                                 
7 It is possible that the construction of the human capital spillover variable creates an endogeneity problem.  
This issues are discussed in footnote 19.    9
data are not only deflated over time but also by an index that accounts for living-cost 
differences across provinces.  Therefore, our data are comparable across provinces where 
living costs are quite different.  GDP and capital-stock deflators are based on official 
price indexes (China Statistical Yearbook) linked to the 1990 national values of a typical 
living expenditure basket reported in Brandt and Holz (2006), specifying Beijing as the 
base province and 1990 as the base year.
8   
To estimate the capital stock for each province, we adopt Holz’s (2006) 
cumulative investment approach.  Holz’s method adjusts official data so that investment- 
and capital-stock figures more closely approximate appropriate theoretical concepts of 
productive capital.  The equation for constructing capital stock follows Equation 7’ in 
Holz (2006):
9  
1
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1
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= −
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=+ − ∑ ,    k = 16,  
where ROFAt is “the real original value of fixed assets”, and k is “the average number of 
years between purchase and decommissioning of fixed assets” (Holz, 2006).
10  The 
variable investmenti is effective investment, defined as the product of the transfer rate and 
gross fixed capital formation.  Holz defines the transfer rate as the ratio of official 
effective investment to official total investment expenditures.
11  The variable scrap_ratei 
is set to be 1% in the initial year, and it is moved linearly up to 2.5% in 2003.
12  The 
variable Pi denotes the price index for investment.  Due to the lack of investment price 
data prior to 1991, we construct an implicit deflator for capital formation for the years 
                                                 
8 The capital-stock deflator is constructed as follows.  The first step is to construct the implicit deflator of 
gross fixed capital formation for the period 1966-1990.  The second step is to combine the implicit deflator 
series with the official price indices of investment in fixed assets (available since 1991 from China 
Statistical Yearbook).  The third step is to construct the comparable provincial capital-stock deflator, 
assuming 50% of components in the original deflator series are comparable across provinces and the 
remaining provincial differences in the deflator series can be accounted by Brandt and Holz’s (2006) 1990 
national values of a typical living expenditure basket. 
9 An alternative approach to construct physical capital is the NIA method also discussed in Holz (2006).  
Fleisher, Li and Zhao (2006) use the NIA approach.  In this study, we apply the cumulative investment 
approach, because based on Holz (2006), this approach works better in panel data and in controlling for the 
problem caused by the official revaluations of the original values of fixed assets in 1993.  
10 Holz (2006) suggests that k = 16 or above is preferred. 
11 Due to the lack of data, we use Holz’s (2006) the estimated national transfer rates to approximate 
provincial transfer rates. 
12 This imputation was kindly suggested by Carsten Holz.   10
1966 through 1990 from State Statistical Bureau (1997).
13  The initial value of fixed 
assets (OFA0) is assumed to be the nominal depreciation value over the depreciation rate, 
which is set at 0.05.  For a discussion of assumed depreciation rates see Wang and Yao 
(2003).   
The numbers of college graduates are estimated based on the annual flow of 
college graduates anchored to periodic population census data.  Details are contained in 
Fleisher, Li and Zhao (2006).  The numbers of high school graduates along with the 
infrastructural data are provided by Sylvie Demurger for the years 1978 through 1998 
and from State Statistical Bureau for the years 1999 through 2003.  Foreign direct 
investment data from 1985 to 1996 are obtained from China Statistics Press (1999).  Data 
after 1995 are from State Statistical Bureau (various years).  The original data are 
deflated using the U.S. GDP deflator with 1990 as the base year.  Summary statistics are 
reported in Tables 2a, 2b and 2c. 
As can be seen in Tables 2a, 2b and 2c, on average, the ratio of the workforce 
with secondary school or above to those with less education averaged about 33% in 1985; 
this ratio rose to 45% in 1994 and reached 68% in 2003. The ratio of individuals with at 
least a college education in the population was about 1.3% in 1985; it roughly doubled to 
2.5% in 1994, and it reached 6.2% in 2003.  There is considerable variation in this ratio 
across provinces.  The distribution of FDI per worker also varies widely across provinces.  
Between 1985 and 1994, FDI shot up from $5.27/worker to $62.34/worker; subsequently, 
the rate of increase was slower, and the ratio reached $78/worker in 2003. The 
acceleration of capital formation is distributed very unequally across provinces, and it 
exhibits a downward trend.  The telephone infrastructure intensity increased dramatically 
and accelerated over the entire period, while road intensity increased at a much slower 
speed, also accelerating in the second decade.  Market-economy development as 
measured by the ratio of total employment in non-state sectors increased 13-fold between 
1985 and 1994 and 2.8 times between 1994 and 2003.  However, the ratio is still quite 
low in absolute terms and in comparison to other transition economies (Fleisher, 
Sabirianova, and Wang, 2005), less than 6% in 2003.    
                                                 
13 We first collect nominal values and real growth rates of gross fixed capital formation.  Then, we 
construct the implicit deflator as follows: [(nomial value)t / (nomial value)t-1] / (real growth rate)t =  [(Pricet 
× Quantityt) / (Pricet-1 × Quantityt-1)]  / (Quantityt / Quantityt-1) = Pricet / Pricet-1.   11
4.  Empirical Results 
Table 3 reports estimation results for a provincial-level production function with 
two types of labor categorized according to educational attainment.  There are three 
columns.  The first column reports simple ordinary least squares (OLS) results as a bench 
mark; columns 2 and 3 are estimated with a 2-way fixed effects (FE) procedure 
(including dummy variables for each year and province); column 2 is unrestricted with 
respect to returns to scale and column 3 imposes constant returns to scale (CRS).   
In column 1, there is strong evidence for the significance of the structural break, 
in that the elasticities of capital and of two categories of labor differ significantly between 
the two periods.  The FE estimates are designed to control for the well-known problem of 
omitted variables in estimating production functions, which leads to inconsistent 
estimates of the inputs elasticities.  As expected, the F-test strongly rejects the null of no 
fixed effects.  The biggest difference between the FE and OLS estimates, though, is in the 
elasticity of less-educated labor.  In the OLS estimation, the elasticity of less-educated 
labor is positive after 1994 but is almost zero in the first time period.  In the FE 
estimation without imposing CRS, the elasticity of less-educated labor is also more 
negative before 1994.  One possible explanation is that workers with less than a high 
school diploma are so abundant that their marginal contribution to provincial production 
is negligible.  The evidence from our estimates is that this “surplus” diminished after 
1994; this is consistent with the hypothesis that Deng’s “South Trip” did mark and 
acceleration in China’s transformation from a planned economy to a market economy.  In 
column 2, we see that the estimated capital elasticity is smaller before 1994 than 
afterward; while the elasticity of educated labor is not only  much larger than that of less-
educated labor, but also larger during the early period than in the later period. 
When the FE estimates are not constrained to CRS, the sum of the input 
elasticities is much smaller than 1 for both time periods.
14  Given our prior that the 
aggregate production function for Chinese provinces is plausibly CRS, we follow much 
literature and impose this restriction. The elasticity of capital is higher under the CRS 
constraint, as is that of educated labor.  The sum of the input elasticities of capital and 
                                                 
14 Such diseconomies of scale in an aggregate production function seem implausible and, we suspect are 
inherent in application of FE estimation, which would increase the share of variation in the regressors that 
is due to measurement error and leads to attenuation bias.   12
educated labor is close to unity, implying that the (residual) elasticity of less educated 
labor is negligible, which is consistent with the results without imposition of CRS.
15 
When the CRS constraint is imposed, there is no clear evidence of a structural break in 
the estimated input elasticities separating the period before 1994 from that afterward.         
 
  4.1 Provincial marginal products 
One way to view regional productivity disparities is to use the estimated 
production function to calculate provincial marginal products for labor (MPL) and capital 
(MPK).  Figures 3 and 4 show that  MPL for educated labor and MPK follow different 
trends: while the series for MPL for educated labor have grown and diverged, those for  
MPK initially declined, but trended upward after about 1990 and tended to converge, at 
least among three regions.  It is notable that MPK, which is an approximation of the rate 
of return to physical capital, has remained relatively high, despite economy-wide growth 
in ratios of physical capital to labor.  In the northeast, coastal and interior regions, MPK 
reached a level above 30% after 1994, while the far west region, MPK has been relatively 
stable, falling behind other regions after 1996.  The northeast region has experienced 
fastest growth in MPK since 1991.   
The MPL of workers with at least a high school education rose everywhere; there 
was an approximately 3-fold increase in the coastal and northeast region. The coastal 
region experienced the fastest growth, and its advantage over other regions has been 
rising over time.  Consistent with its negligible estimated production elasticity, the 
pattern of MPL for workers with below secondary education is very much lower than that 
of educated workers, and the disparity between the two categories of labor has been 
rising rapidly.  The increasing gap between the MPL of educated workers and those who 
have not graduated from secondary school suggests that there is a high rate of return to 
schooling beyond the primary level. 
The regional distribution of factor marginal products and their trends raises 
concerns for the future course of regional inequality.  The much higher marginal 
productivity of educated labor in the coastal region area compared to the far west and 
                                                 
15 We also estimated models with CRS imposed only after 1994, based on the assumption that it is more 
likely to reach CRS as economic growth continues.  The results are close to the model with CRS for both 
periods.    13
interior regions is likely to induce a drain brain from the disadvantaged to more 
developed areas.  Similarly, the relatively low marginal product of capital in the far west 
region discourages investment there.  Thus the future growth is likely to continue to be 
slower in the low-income areas of China than in the high-income, rapidly growing areas.  
In order to develop policy recommendations, we need to calculate internal rates of return 
that take into account both marginal benefits and costs for alternative policy instruments.  
Moreover, the policy benefits should consider not only their impacts on factor marginal 
products, but also their effects on TFP growth.   
 
4.2 Total Factor Productivity Growth 
  TFP growth has important implications for regional disparity in China’s economic 
development.  Figure 5 shows the TFP growth pattern for each region.  The growth 
increased from 1989 to 1994 in every region and then slowed down except for the 
northeast.  The slower pace of TFP growth in the later stage of economic reform in China 
has been observed in other studies, for example Islam et al. (2006).  Since 1999, regional 
TFP annual growth rates have been mostly in the rage of 1-5% with northeast region on 
the top.  
In order to understand the determinants of TFP growth, as discussed in the 
methodology section, we model TFP growth as a function of FDI, physical capital 
vintage, and human capital, with human capital operating through two channels, both a 
direct effect on TFP growth and an indirect effect through technology spillovers.
16  Given 
the probable lag between investment and placing new capital into production, we lag FDI 
one year relative to the TFP growth series.  This lag also mitigates the endogeneity 
problem, insofar as TFP growth increases the profitability of investment projects. We 
also include interaction terms between the 1994 dummy and other regressors to capture 
the possibility of a structural break following Deng’s “South Trip.”   
TFP growth regression results are presented in tables 4 and 5.  In table 5, 
variables representing infrastructure capital are included as regressors.  Each table reports 
the results of four specifications, all of them estimated with two-way fixed effects: (1) 
                                                 
16 While there is little doubt that the shift of workers from low-productivity agricultural work to higher 
productivity work elsewhere has been a major force in China’s economic growth (Young, 2003), we do not 
explicitly model geographical and intersectoral migration in this paper.     14
TFP derived from production function estimated with no scale constraint; (2) TFP 
derived from  production function constrained to constant; (3) and (4), same as (1) and 
(2), but estimated by Instrumental Variable (IV) procedure.
17   
As can be seen in table 4, columns (1) and (2), although the production function 
estimates are quite different when we impose CRS, the TFP-growth regressions are not 
very sensitive to the imposition of the CRS constraint.  In both cases, most explanatory 
variables have similar sign and significance, the principal exception being the coefficient 
of FDI after 1994, which is positive in both columns, but statistically insignificant in 
column (1).  Additionally, the direct effect of human capital is larger without CRS (0.54), 
compared to that with CRS (0.40).
18   
With or without constrained returns to scale, the estimated impact of FDI is much 
larger and more significant before 1994.  In column (1), the magnitude of the coefficient 
implies that if FDI were to increase by $50/worker (the provincial sample mean is 
$78/worker in 2003), the expected TFP growth rate would be 0.037 (3.7 percentage 
points) more per year before 1994.  For the period 1994 and later, the economic impact is 
negligible by comparison.   
The estimated direct and spillover effects of human capital are positive and 
significant under both specifications of the production function.  For example, the 
coefficient of the college-graduates variables in column (1) implies that, if the ratio of 
college graduates to population increases by 0.01, TFP growth increases by 0.54 
percentage points per year.  An indirect effect of human capital operating through 
technology spillover is modeled in the spillover variable, and it is much larger before 
1994.  As hypothesized, the vintage of capital measured by the acceleration of new 
investment has a positive and significant effect on TFP growth, consistent with the 
hypothesis that new capital embodies technological change.   
We discussed above that FDI may be endogenous because it is likely to earn a 
higher return in places where TFP growth is higher.  Thus FDI and TFP growth are likely 
to be simultaneously determined.  To address this econometric problem, we apply IV 
                                                 
17 In all models, the F-test on fixed effects strongly rejects the null of no fixed effects.  
18 The capital vintage effect and the direct effect of human capital on new innovation should not be affected 
by the stage of economic reform, and thus we do not include a structural change for them.   15
estimation.
19  We use as an instrument for FDI the lagged value of the degree of 
marketization in the local economy, which we measure by proportion of urban labor 
employed in non-state owned firms.  This group of firms includes share holding units, 
joint ownership units, limited liability corporations, share-holding corporations, and units 
funded from abroad, Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan.  Presumably, the previous value of 
the proportion of workers in the non-state owned sector is correlated with local FDI, but 
not correlated with the current TFP growth.
20  As Table 2c shows, approximately 6% of 
urban workers were employed in the non-state owned sector nationally in 2003, and the 
variation across provinces is extremely high.    
The 2SLS estimation results are reported in columns (3) and (4).  As expected, the 
degree of marketization has a positive and significant effect on FDI in the first stage (not 
reported).
21  A Hausman test on the endogeneity of FDI rejects the null that FDI is 
exogenous, regardless of whether the CRS constraint is imposed on the underlying 
production function.
22  The 2SLS FE estimation results are generally similar to the FE 
estimates in columns (1) and (2).  The major difference as that the estimated impact of 
FDI on TFP growth is larger both before and after 1994, and it is statistically significant 
in all cases.  The estimated direct effect of human capital (college graduates) is also 
higher.  
The estimated impact of local infrastructure capital on TFP growth is reported in 
table 5.  Not only is better infrastructure likely to promote the growth of total factor 
productivity, omission of this variable may lead to biased estimates because FDI and 
human capital measures are likely to be positively correlated with local infrastructure, 
i.e., a place with better infrastructure usually has more educated people and can attract 
                                                 
19 The most serious potential endogeneity problem for the human capital spillover variable is due to the 
potential simultaneity between TFP and the output level, which is used to construct the degree of spillover.  
However, the extent and the direction of such correlation is unclear.  In order to test the sensitivity our 
estimates to this problem, we have estimated our models with one- and two-period lags of spillover 
variable, assuming that previous spillover does not depend on the current TFP growth. The results are quite 
robust.  
20 Hale and Long (2007) used port availability and access to domestic market of the province as an 
instrument for FDI.  
21 It is arguable that the degree of marketization should be included in the TFP model instead of using it as 
an instrument. We tested this possibility by including the market system as a regressor in a number of 
alternative specifications, but it is insignificant.    
22 The Hausman test is conducted using a regression based approach by appending the residuals from the 
first stage regression of endogenous variables.    16
more FDI.  So omission of infrastructure variables will cause over-estimation of the 
effects of FDI and human capital.  We represent local infrastructure capital with two 
variables, telephone ownership and length of roads and highways relative to surface area 
of a province.  Telephone intensity can be viewed as a proxy of telecommunication 
infrastructure, while road intensity represents transportation infrastructure.   
As can be seen in table 5, the telephone ownership rate has a positive estimated 
effect on TFP growth, but road intensity has a positive and significant coefficient only 
before 1994.
23  Inclusion of the infrastructure measures in the FE estimation (columns 1 
and 2) leads to a much smaller and less significant estimated coefficient of FDI, both 
before and after 1994.  The estimated direct effect of human capital also becomes much 
smaller and is statistically insignificant. Both results indicate possible over-estimation 
when infrastructure variables are omitted. The spillover effect of human capital does not 
change much between tables 4 and 5.   
In columns (3) and (4) of tables 4 and 5, we see that the 2SLS estimation is more 
robust to the addition of the infrastructure variables than is the FE estimation.  The 
biggest change is that the coefficient of FDI becomes insignificant both in statistical 
sense and economic sense in the period following 1994.  For the pre-1994 period, the 
estimated coefficient of FDI is nearly the same in magnitude and significance in the 2SLS 
estimates shown in both tables 4 and 5.  In both specifications, the 2SLS estimated 
coefficient of FDI is much larger than the FE estimate, more consistently so before 1994 
than after.  Although the direct effect of human capital is smaller, it remains marginally 
significant in the 2SLS estimation when CRS is not imposed on the underlying 
production function.  As expected again, compared to Table 5, in 2SLS estimation when 
infrastructure is controlled for, the estimated effects of FDI and human capital become 
smaller.  In general, the effects of infrastructure on TFP in the IV estimation become 
smaller relative to the FE estimates, both in magnitude and in statistical significance.
24     
                                                 
23 We believe that the effect of telecommunication infrastructure should not change with economic 
structure, and thus do not interact it with year 1994 dummy.  Inclusion of the interaction terms makes it 
insignificant in both periods.  The effect of transportation, however, may change with the economic 
structure.  For example, transportation infrastructure may be used more intensively as market economy 
develops and as transportation services and construction can be run by non-state owned sectors.  
24 We conducted unit root tests on the variables in the TFP regressions, namely, the TFP growth rate, FDI 
per capita, and the measures of human capital, spillovers, infrastructure, and physical-capital vintage.  Two 
types of unit root tests were carried out: Dickey-Fuller GLS test (Elliott, Rothenberg, and Stock, 1996) and   17
To summarize the estimation results of alternative specifications and estimation 
procedures for the TFP growth equation, we draw the following conclusions.  First, FDI 
has a much larger effect on TFP growth before 1994.  After 1994, its effect is much 
smaller or statistically insignificant.  Second, the direct effect of human capital measured 
by the proportion of college graduates is positive and highly significant in the models 
without infrastructure.  It remains positive, although statistically insignificant in some 
estimation, when infrastructure variables are included in the model.  Third, the spillover 
effect of human capital on TFP growth is positive and statistically significant, which is 
very robust to model specifications and estimation methods.  The spillover effect appears 
to be much stronger before 1994, approximately double the effect after 1994.  Fourth, 
capital vintage always has positive and statistically significant effect on TFP growth.  
Finally, telecommunication infrastructure as measured by telephone intensity generally 
has had a positive effect on TFP growth.  The estimated coefficients for road intensity, on 
the other hand, are negligible in 2SLS estimates. 
Taken together, these results suggest either that disembodied technology 
transmission as an engine of growth became less important as the reforms inspired by 
Deng’s “South Trip” took hold or that distance from Shanghai became a smaller barrier 
to the transmission of technology spillovers.  To test this conjecture, we estimated the 
regression equation reported in column (4) without “discounting” the human-capital 
spillover variable with distance from Shanghai.  The estimation results are very similar 
for all variables except the interaction term between the pre-1994 dummy and the 
spillover variable.  The coefficient of this variable becomes negative and statistically 
significant, implying that without the distance correction, the spillover effect is 
                                                                                                                                                 
the KPSS test (Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt, and Shin, 1992).  The DF-GLS test is based on the null of 
unit root while the KPSS test is based on the null of stationarity.  The results of these tests indicate that 
most of the variables seem to contain a unit root in a number of provinces.  However, it is well documented 
in the literature that most unit root tests are not powerful enough to distinguish a unit root process with a 
highly persistent stationary process based on a short period of data, such as used in this study.  Moreover, 
the confirmatory results based on unit root tests (e.g., DF-GLS) and stationary tests (e.g., KPSS) are not 
always correct.  In their review of Monte Carlo simulation studies from the literature, Maddala and Kim 
(1998) conclude that the proportion of correct confirmations is low if the true model is stationary.  
Therefore, we choose to run panel regressions without taking into account possible unit root processes.  If 
some of the variables are indeed not stationary, we run the risk of spurious regressions, but our regression 
results do not seem to display serious symptoms of spurious regressions, such as, high R-square and t-
values.  Test statistics are available from the authors on request.   18
unobservable before 1994. That is, the effect of distance as a barrier to technology 
transmission declined.     
5.  Policy Implications       
In order to understand the economic importance of our estimation results, we 
calculate the impacts of possible policy interventions through human capital and 
infrastructure investments.  An output-maximizing policy maker would rely on rates of 
return in designing an optimal investment policy.  Therefore, we estimate the internal 
rates of return to investment in education and telecommunication infrastructure with 
telephones as a proxy.  The internal rate of return is calculated by equalizing the 
estimated cost to the present value of estimated future benefits as reflected in the 
contribution to TFP growth or directly to production (as in the case of secondary or 
higher schooling).
25   
 
5.1 Internal Rates of Return.  The returns to higher education and infrastructure 
are assumed to emanate from their impacts on TFP growth, while the return to secondary 
education is postulated to arise from its direct impact as a factor of production.
26  We 
develop simple approaches to estimate the costs of these investments.  We assume that 
the inevitable errors in estimating costs do not vary substantially across provinces, but 
rather are more serious for comparison of alternative investment strategies.  We therefore 
must be much more cautious in comparing returns to different types of investment than in 
deriving the implications of each policy individually for regional or provincial inequality.   
In estimating the return to investing in secondary education, we assume that less 
educated labor is sent to high school or college and then becomes highly-educated labor 
with a higher marginal product.  In estimating the return to education based its impact on 
TFP growth, we assume that high school students are sent to college and thus contribute 
                                                 
25 We do not compute the internal rates of return to road construction because the coefficient estimate of 
road construction is mostly insignificant. 
26 In computing the rates of return to education, we separate the impacts of education into two parts: a 
direct effect and an indirect effect.  The direct effect of education operates through the production function 
by sending less educated workers to acquire high school education.  The indirect effect of education 
operates through the TFP growth equation by sending workers with high school diplomas to receive college 
education.  The lengths of high school and college education are assumed to be 3 and 4 years, respectively.  
The rates of return to schooling are based on the assumption of a 40-year working life.   19
to higher TFP growth after entering the workforce.  Costs of education consist of two 
components: foregone production while a worker is taken out of production and sent to 
school and the direct costs of teachers, administrators, “bricks and mortar,” and other 
direct expenses of schooling.  Details of estimating the internal rates of return to human 
capital are given in Appendix A and B.    
The calculated internal rates of return to education are reported in table 6, 
columns 1 and 2.  Column 1 contains the estimated rates of return to secondary 
education, which occurs directly in the production process.  The national average rate of 
return is approximately 50%, and is almost the same magnitude in each of the four 
regions.  It is interesting to compare the estimated rates of return in table 6 with the 
marginal product of educated labor shown in figure 3.  It is clear that the marginal 
product of educated labor is much higher in the coastal region than elsewhere, but 
therefore so is the opportunity cost of sending a coastal worker to high school.  Thus, 
when the opportunity cost is included in the calculation of policy benefits, the northeast 
and interior regions have higher returns than the coastal region (particularly than in 
Beijing, which has a particularly high concentration of educated workers).  Therefore, 
one might argue that it is justifiable for the government to invest more resources to 
secondary education in less developed areas for both the political reason to reduce 
inequality and the economic reason to generate comparable returns.  
The calculated national average rate of return per year of additional schooling to 
investment in higher education is reported in column 2 of table 6.  It is based on the 2SLS 
estimates reported in column (4) of table 5.
27  The national average rate of return is 
approximately 33%. The interior region has the highest return of 38%, much higher than 
in other regions.  There is more regional variation in the rate of return to college than in 
the rate of return to secondary school.  As can be seen from Table 1, the proportion of 
college graduates is 4.15% in the interior region in 2003, the lowest among the four 
regions, while the national average is 5.17%.  It is clear that the low density of college 
graduates in the population and the relatively high productivity generates the highest 
                                                 
27  The estimated internal rate of return to college is a very conservative estimate as we used the results 
from column (4) in table 5 and treat the direct effect of college education as zero.  If we use the results from 
column (3) without imposing CRS, where the direct effect of college education is almost significant at the 
10% level, the estimated rate would be much higher.     20
returns for investing in college education in the interior region.  In figure 2, we see that 
the interior region has very low per capita GDP relative to the coast (less than half as 
high).  The investment in human capital to increase the number of college graduates in 
this region should have an important impact in reducing its income gap relative to the 
coast and northeast.  
  Column (3) in table 6 contains the calculated rates of return for telephone 
infrastructure, based on its contribution to TFP growth.  Since the impact of telephone 
ownership is likely to reflect all telecommunications infrastructure, we estimate the cost 
based on total telecommunication investment accordingly. The assumptions and methods 
used are detailed in Appendix C.  We assume zero maintenance costs and thus may 
overestimate the rates of return.  The national average rate of return to investment in 
telecommunication infrastructure is nearly 52%.
28  Regional variation is high, ranging 
from nearly 68% in the coastal region to approximately 41% in the far west and interior 
regions.  Unlike the return of human capital investment, the investment in 
telecommunication infrastructure appears to be positively correlated with local 
development.  The rates of return are much higher for relatively developed areas.  For 
example, the return is 92% in Shanghai and 70% in Beijing; while only 35% in Gansu 
and 28% in Guizhou.  We conjecture that this regional pattern is attributable to scale 
effects, and it implies that efficient infrastructure investments, while productive, are not 
likely to reduce regional inequality.  Rather they are likely to increase regional 
disparities.  
It is known that policies that improve efficiency may also increase inequality.  
Our results show that this is not the case for investment in human capital in China, 
particularly investment in higher education, where the return is highest in China’s very 
large and economically disadvantaged interior region. Based on the internal rates of 
return, we find that investing in human capital, both in secondary education and higher 
education, generates comparable or higher returns in less developed areas relative than in 
the more developed coastal region.  Thus it should be effective in achieving both 
efficiency and equality goals. 
                                                 
28 Given the difficulty in estimating the cost of infrastructure and education, we do not compare the rates of 
return between them.     21
 
5.2 Hypothetical policy experiments.  Given that the starting point of this paper 
was the observation that regional inequality in China has soared, it is interesting to 
perform a hypothetical policy experiment.  Suppose, for example, that the central 
government were to invest in human capital or telecommunication infrastructure in the 
northeast, far west and interior regions in order to reduce the regional per-capita output 
gaps.  The total amount of investment is assumed to be 10% of central government total 
revenue, every year for 5 years.  The first investment would yield returns starting in 2004, 
and the last investment would yield returns in 2008.  The fund from the central 
government would be distributed to the provinces in those non-coastal regions annually, 
weighted by the size of each province’s population.   
We analyze three scenarios:  allocation to increase the number of college 
graduates, to increase the number of secondary-school graduates, or to investment in 
telecommunications infrastructure.  Assume the burden of the tax is on consumption 
expenditure in the year it is imposed.  We use the regression results underlying the rate of 
return estimates reported in table 6 to discuss these policy alternatives in terms of their 
ability to reduce regional inequality over a 10-year horizon through 2013.  Details of the 
derivations and calculations are reported in appendix D.  Table 7 shows the impacts of 
these alternative projects. 
  The first line of each cell in table 7 is the predicted ratio of per-capita GDP in one 
of the other three regions to the coastal region if one of the three policy actions is 
undertaken.
29  The last row shows the predicted regional GDP ratio if no policy is 
undertaken, and the second line of each cell is the difference between the no-policy ratio 
and the ratio under a given policy.  Finally, the third line in each cell shows the 
percentage decline in the provincial GDP ratio under each policy.  For example, the 
number 0.4999 in the first line of the last column indicates that a policy of increasing 
secondary education in the interior region, with no change in the coastal region, would 
increase the interior/coast inequality ratio from 0.4006 to 0.4999, or by approximately 
24.79% of the 2003 ratio by the year 2013.  In the first row, we see that the impact of a 
                                                 
29 The policy actions are applied only to the non-coastal regions.  The 2013 per-capita GDP in the coastal 
region is predicted without any policy intervention.   22
policy focused on secondary education would have about the same impact on reducing 
regional inequality in the far west as in the interior.  The same policy applied to the 
northeast region would reduce the income gap by about 15%. 
In the second row of table 7, we see that investment in college education would 
reduce the inequality ratio between the interior/coastal gap by approximately 15%, 
double that for the far west region and much higher than for northeast region.  This is 
regional difference probably attributable to the much lower proportion of college 
graduates in the interior region than elsewhere.  The impact of investment in 
telecommunication infrastructure would reduce the income gap by about a third across all 
three non-coastal regions.   
 
6.  Conclusion and Recommendations 
  China’s spectacular economic growth has benefited its provinces and regions 
quite unequally. China now has one of the highest degrees of regional income in 
inequality in the world.  We investigate the determinants of the dispersion in rates of 
economic growth and TFP growth.  We hypothesize that the regional pattern of these 
growth rates can be understood as a function of several interrelated factors, which include 
investment in physical capital, human capital, and infrastructure capital; the infusion of 
new technology and its regional spread; and market reforms, with a major step forward 
occurring following Deng Xiaoping’s “South Trip” in 1992.   
  The following empirical results are robust to alternative model specifications and 
estimation methods.  First, FDI had much larger effect on TFP growth before 1994.  After 
1994, its effect becomes much smaller or statistically insignificant.  The declining effect 
of FDI in the later stage of economic transition is consistent with the hypothesis that the 
acceleration of market reforms reduced the impact of FDI on technology transmission, 
not because technological advance became less important, but because the channels of its 
dissemination became more diffuse. We find that telecommunication infrastructure, 
which we measure by telephone intensity, generally has a positive effect on TFP growth, 
but that transportation infrastructure, which we measure by road intensity, has no 
significant impact after 1994.  We also find a robust relationship between capital vintage   23
and TFP growth. This is consistent with the hypothesis that investment in new capital 
stock is an effective means of technology transmission.   
We find that human capital positively affects output in three ways. First, educated 
labor makes a direct contribution to production.  Workers with a secondary-school 
diploma or higher education have a much higher marginal product than labor with less 
than a secondary-school diploma.  Second, we estimate a positive, direct effect of human 
capital (measured by the proportion of college graduates) on TFP growth.  This direct 
effect is hypothesized to come from domestic innovation activities.  Third, we present 
evidence of an indirect spillover effect of human capital on TFP growth which is positive 
and statistically significant and which is very robust to model specifications and 
estimation methods.  The spillover effect appears to be much stronger before 1994, 
approximately half again as large as after 1994.  This evidence of regime shift after 1994 
is consistent with that for the impact of FDI, and is also consistent with the impact of 
accelerating market reform. 
We derive cost-benefit analysis of possible policies to raise GDP using an internal 
rate of return metric and obtain the following results from a policy “experiment” in which 
we project the impact of one time increases in human capital and infrastructure capital on 
regional inequality.  (1) The interior region would gain substantially relative to the coast 
from increasing the proportion of workers with a high-school diploma, as would the far 
west; the northeast region would also gain significantly.  (2) Investment in college 
graduates would generate a relative gain for the interior that is much larger than that for 
the far west and the northeast.  (3) All three non-coastal regions would experience a large 
increase in their per-capita incomes relative to the coast from investment in 
telecommunications infrastructure.  It is important to note that rates of return to 
investment in both levels of human capital are negatively related to the current relative 
income standing of the four regions.  However the return to telecommunications 
investment is highest in the coast.  Thus efficiency and equality considerations coincide 
for the human-capital investments, but are opposed for infrastructure investment.  
We find evidence that China’s transition toward a market economy accelerated 
after 1994. A beneficial aspect of this marketization has been the decline of regional 
barriers to the spread of technology and to the movement of labor and capital.  As a   24
result, regional discrepancies in the impact of FDI, infrastructure and human capital have 
declined.  A worrisome implication, though, is that regional income and productivity 
gaps appear to have widened significantly as physical and human capital have moved 
toward destinations where their productivity and pay are higher.  Thus, Chinese policy 
makers face a dilemma, because continued economic transformation toward a market 
system may aggravate the problem of regional inequality, with attendant political 
implications.  The government may face choices between policies that increase the 
efficiency of resource allocation and those that benefit economically disadvantaged 
regions relative to the coast.  Certainly this appears to be true for investing in 
telecommunication infrastructure in China’s less developed areas.  However, the choice 
is not so difficult when it comes to investment in human capital.  Hence, increasing the 
number of high-school and college graduates in less developed areas in China serves both 
efficiency goal and equality goal.  We conclude that investing in human capital will be an 
effective policy to reduce regional gaps in China as well as an efficient means for 
increasing the overall level of GDP and economic growth. 
There is a direct implication of our research findings for China’s on-going Go-
West, formally known as the “Grand Western Development” Project, which was 
launched in 2000.  It encompasses eleven provinces including the entire far west region 
as defined in this paper and five provinces in our interior region. The largest part of 
expenditure mandating from this project is focused on investment in infrastructure.  
Between 2000 and 2005, the cumulative investment in infrastructure was about 1 trillion 
Yuan (about US$125 billion).
30  The results of our research imply that, it is important to 
put human capital investment ahead of infrastructure in this project, both for reasons of 
economic efficiency and for reducing inequality.     
 
                                                 
30 http://cppcc.people.com.cn/GB/34961/70385/70386/4783169.html   25
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Table 1  
High School and College Graduates (%) 
 
  High school graduates / Population  College graduates / Population 
  Coastal Northeast  Far 
West  Interior   National  Coastal Northeast Far 
West  Interior   National 
1982 26.66  34.55  21.19  22.12  24.80  0.54  0.63  0.47  0.33  0.44 
1983 26.20  34.11  21.46  21.73  24.41  1.02  1.36  0.91  0.63  0.84 
1984 25.77  33.70  21.69  21.34  24.03  1.05  1.39  0.92  0.64  0.86 
1985 26.52  34.85  22.83  22.03  24.79  1.07  1.42  0.94  0.66  0.88 
1986 27.26  35.95  23.91  22.73  25.55  1.10  1.46  0.95  0.68  0.91 
1987 28.02  36.96  25.12  23.45  26.33  1.15  1.52  0.98  0.71  0.94 
1988 28.79  38.03  26.44  24.13  27.10  1.19  1.58  1.01  0.73  0.98 
1989 29.51  38.90  27.63  24.80  27.82  1.24  1.63  1.04  0.76  1.02 
1990 29.50  39.67  28.16  25.28  28.16  1.66  2.33  1.42  1.03  1.38 
1991 30.17  40.62  29.13  25.96  28.86  1.84  2.74  2.09  1.26  1.63 
1992 30.90  41.59  30.04  26.65  29.59  1.89  2.80  2.11  1.29  1.67 
1993 31.68  42.51  30.89  27.36  30.35  1.93  2.85  2.12  1.32  1.70 
1994 32.49  43.47  31.44  28.01  31.08  1.98  2.91  2.13  1.35  1.74 
1995 33.25  44.39  31.88  28.74  31.82  2.04  2.98  2.14  1.39  1.79 
1996 34.04  44.92  32.50  29.34  32.48  2.22  3.37  2.77  1.61  2.03 
1997 35.13  45.95  33.17  30.25  33.45  2.69  3.81  2.97  1.73  2.30 
1998 36.46  47.14  33.94  31.23  34.56  3.15  4.24  3.17  1.84  2.57 
1999 37.79  48.25  34.82  32.21  35.67  3.52  4.54  3.98  2.04  2.86 
2000 37.08  49.34  34.87  34.04  36.50  4.09  5.30  3.55  2.74  3.49 
2001 39.75  50.48  36.43  34.56  37.84  4.90  5.27  4.41  3.02  3.94 
2002 41.29  51.82  37.57  35.98  39.28  5.59  5.28  5.21  3.38  4.40 
2003 42.88  53.32  38.95  37.58  40.86  6.20  6.58  6.00  4.15  5.17 
                           Note: Tibet and Inner Mongolia are excluded for lack of continuous data. 
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Table 2a 
Summary Statistics - 1985 
Mean (Standard Deviation) 
1985 
Variable  Coastal Northeast  Far  West  Interior   National
GDP  622.75 547.48 116.05 484.21 482.88
(100,000,000  yuan)  (284.34) (241.10)  (73.06) (236.48) (281.83)
Capital  1081.91  1386.15 216.78 953.90 935.39
(100,000,000  yuan)  (546.06) (600.75) (102.67) (671.64) (636.15)
Labor  secondary  and  higher  529.33 466.48 112.40 498.09 447.85
(10,000  workers)  (272.43) (184.45)  (87.83) (270.78) (274.34)
Labor below secondary  1430.69  862.95  389.27  1772.49  1352.58
(10,000  workers)  (974.98) (239.00) (344.55) (927.25) (942.55)
FDI  /  total  workforce  14.95 0.52 0.22 0.48 5.27
(1 US dollars per worker)  (25.19)  (0.45)  (0.13)  (0.48)  (15.62)
College  graduates  /  population  20.34 14.11 10.07  6.82 12.62
(1 person / 1000 persons)  (21.00)  (1.77)  (1.91)  (1.99)  (13.19)
Human-capital  spillover  variable  0.024 0.011 0.011 0.019 0.018
    (0.023) (0.003) (0.004) (0.008) (0.015)
Second difference of log capital  0.009  0.010  0.015  0.004  0.008
  (0.013) (0.009) (0.022) (0.009) (0.013)
Telephones  /  population  13.94 9.65 5.03 3.39 7.84
(1  unit/  1000  person)  (13.37) (1.95) (3.03) (1.37) (8.94)
Roads  /  area  0.30 0.15 0.05 0.19 0.20
(km length per km
2)  (0.09) (0.07) (0.04) (0.04) (0.10)
Urban non-state workforce / total 
workforce  20.76 23.05  2.28  2.03 10.65
(1 person / 10000 persons)  (13.77)  (36.33)  (1.24)  (1.96)  (16.03)
 
Notes: 
1. All the monetary values were deflated with the base of Beijing 1990.  The means are the provincial 
average, and the Standard deviations are in the parentheses. 
2. Tibet and Inner Mongolia are excluded for lack of continuous data. 
3.  “Human-capital spillover variable”: 
max,
max_
1
[( ) ]
ti t
it
ii t
yy
h
dy
−
.  hi,t is measured as the proportion of 
people who have at least college degrees, yi,t is GDP per capita (10,000 yuan per person), and dmax_i is the 
rail road distance between province i and the province with the highest GDP per capita in units of 1,000 
kilometers.  If ymax_i = yi,t, spillover term = 0. 
4. “Urban non-state workforce” are employed in share holding units, joint ownership units, limited liability 
corporations, share-holding corporations, and units funded from abroad, Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan. 
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Table 2b 
Summary Statistics - 1994 
Mean (Standard Deviation) 
1994 
Variable  Coastal Northeast  Far  West  Interior   National
GDP  1790.38 1140.95  263.73 1054.25 1192.15
(100,000,000  yuan)  (984.07) (522.66) (195.26) (516.82) (831.24)
Capital  2924.61 2522.14  562.89 1871.91 2101.13
(100,000,000  yuan)  (1385.08) (1043.59)  (352.57) (1062.23) (1328.09)
Labor  secondary  and  higher  771.86 693.80 196.23 788.35 684.62
(10,000  workers)  (432.69) (198.62) (152.94) (408.41) (413.99)
Labor below secondary  1585.79  897.70  445.61  2047.08  1528.35
(10,000  workers)  (1089.38) (188.93) (420.02)  (1051.42)  (1074.56)
FDI / total workforce  157.27  35.83  7.12  11.98  62.34
(1 US dollars per worker)  (115.54)  (24.48)  (8.30)  (8.25)  (94.50)
College  graduates  /  population  38.06 28.77 21.59 14.02 24.80
(1 person / 1000 persons)  (41.44)  (2.57)  (7.15)  (5.37)  (25.68)
Human-capital  spillover  variable  0.030 0.023 0.028 0.041 0.033
    (0.029) (0.005) (0.010) (0.018) (0.021)
Second difference of log capital  0.010  -0.001  -0.002  0.003  0.005
  (0.016) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012)
Telephones  /  population  80.16 39.84 19.82 15.48 40.39
(1 unit/ 1000 person)  (56.22)  (5.32)  (7.67)  (4.30)  (43.17)
Roads  /  area  0.40 0.18 0.06 0.21 0.25
(km length per km
2)  (0.15) (0.10) (0.05) (0.04) (0.15)
Urban non-state workforce / total 
workforce  333.35 171.18  32.80  44.09 152.96
(1 person / 10000 persons)  (221.90)  (82.77)  (28.92)  (27.30)  (186.01)
 
See note in Table 2a 
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Table 2c 
Summary Statistics - 2003 
Mean (Standard Deviation) 
2003 
Variable  Coastal Northeast  Far  West  Interior   National
GDP  4782.02 2526.56  581.63 2470.28 2967.32
(100,000,000  yuan)  (2632.27) (1081.19)  (406.25) (1249.03) (2232.36)
Capital  7899.16 4163.88 1208.88 3952.38 4885.03
(100,000,000  yuan)  (3708.76) (1525.63)  (796.81) (2313.54) (3492.15)
Labor  secondary  and  higher  1098.67 805.43 246.79  1140.44 956.90
(10,000  workers)  (690.43) (239.34) (173.02) (587.09) (623.32)
Labor below secondary  1467.12  704.00  395.76  1908.34  1403.36
(10,000  workers)  (999.34) (182.36) (321.28) (971.78)  (1003.44)
FDI / total workforce  194.58  48.70  3.82  18.03  78.19
(1 US dollars per worker)  (152.02)  (58.97)  (2.94)  (19.51)  (121.23)
College  graduates  /  population  85.96 64.66 57.42 43.81 62.19
(1 person / 1000 persons)  (56.61)  (19.67)  (23.10)  (12.75)  (38.51)
Human-capital  spillover  variable  0.067 0.048 0.072 0.124 0.089
    (0.055) (0.009) (0.014) (0.067) (0.060)
Second difference of log capital  0.001  0.001  0.000  0.003  0.002
  (0.010) (0.010) (0.014) (0.015) (0.012)
Telephones  /  population  327.18 250.94 170.66 144.38 221.05
(1 unit/ 1000 person)  (87.66)  (45.95)  (30.84)  (31.38)  (99.48)
Roads  /  area  0.65 0.24 0.09 0.36 0.40
(km length per km
2)  (0.25) (0.10) (0.07) (0.10) (0.25)
Urban non-state workforce / total 
workforce  1047.35 627.04 409.52 264.52 587.22
(1 person / 10000 persons)  (754.26)  (89.05)  (266.61)  (105.26)  (557.23)
 
See note in Table 2a  34
 
 
 
Table 3 
Production Function Estimates 1985-2003 
 
2-way FE, 2 periods,  
Dependent variable: log(GDPt) 
(1) 
 
OLS, 2 
periods 
(2) 
 
Scale 
Unconstrained 
(3) 
Scale 
Constrained to 
CRS  
Intercept -1.68
*** 4.44
*** 0.42
*** 
   (-13.38)  (9.42)  (7.70) 
log(Capital t) 0.95
*** 0.48
*** 0.54
*** 
 (29.54)  (19.81)  (18.95) 
log(Labor Secondary and 
Higher t) 0.015  0.20
*** 0.43
*** 
   (0.26)  (3.55) (6.85) 
log(Labor Below Secondary t) 0.20
*** -0.18
***    
   (5.47)   (-2.82)    
log(Capital t)*Year 1994  -0.45
*** -0.18
*** -0.03 
   (-8.17)   (-7.52)  (-0.94) 
log(Labor Secondary and 
Higher t) * Year 1994  0.49
*** 0.16
*** -0.03 
   (5.59)  (4.37)  (-0.69) 
log(Labor Below Secondary t) 
* Year 1994  -0.18
*** -0.092
***    
   (-3.79)   (-4.29)    
Year 1994  1.28
***    
 (7.08)     
      
N 513  513  513 
R square  0.97  0.996  0.99 
Adjusted R square  0.97  0.996  0.99 
F-statistics 2060.29  2357.90  1003.07 
F Test for No Fixed Effects:  
F Value (Pr > F) 
 
89.54 (<.0001)  62.87 (<.0001) 
Notes: 
1. Hainan is included in Guangdong; and Chongqing is included in Sichuan.  Tibet and Inner Mongolia are 
excluded for lack of continuous data. 
2. t-values are in the parentheses.  The stars 
*, 
** and 
*** indicate the significance level at 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. 
3. YB = 1 if year < 1994; 0 otherwise.   
4. Units of measurement.  “GDP”: 100,000,000 yuan.  “Capital”: 100,000,000 yuan.  “Labor Secondary and 
Higher”: 10,000 workers.  “Labor Below Secondary”:  10,000 workers.  All the monetary values were 
deflated with the base of Beijing 1990. 
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Table 4 
TFP growth regression, 1987-2003 
 
  Two-Way FE  Two-way FE + 2SLS 
Dependent variable: log(TFPt) –  
log(TFPt-1) 
(1) 
 
Scale 
Unconstrained 
(2) 
Scale 
Constrained to 
CRS 
(3) 
 
Scale 
Unconstrained 
(4) 
Scale 
Constrained to 
CRS 
Intercept 0.014  -0.0095  -0.033  -0.045
** 
   (0.87)   (-0.64)   (-1.36)   (-1.99) 
FDIt-2 0.037  0.076
** 0.14
** 0.13
** 
   (1.15)  (2.50) (2.30) (2.36) 
FDIt-2 * Year 1994  0.74
*** 0.70
*** 1.94
*** 1.74
*** 
   (3.28)  (3.33) (4.04) (3.92) 
College graduates t-1 0.54
*** 0.40
** 0.79
*** 0.70
*** 
   (2.89)  (2.30) (3.60) (3.41) 
Human capital spillover t-1 0.26
* 0.38
*** 0.33
** 0.39
*** 
   (1.92)  (2.99) (2.17) (2.75) 
Human capital spillover t-1 * Year 1994  0.37
** 0.29
** 0.50
*** 0.41
*** 
   (2.33)  (1.98) (2.94) (2.60) 
Capital Vintage t 0.47
*** 0.39
*** 0.49
*** 0.39
*** 
   (3.93)  (3.48) (3.95) (3.40) 
 
N  459 459 459 459 
R  square  0.98  0.60   
F-statistics  532.24 12.82  495.25 12.14 
F Test for No Fixed Effects: F Value 
(Pr > F) 
572.87 
(<.0001) 12.16  (<.0001) 
530.93 
(0.0001) 11.67  (0.0001) 
Hausman Test for Endogeneity: F 
Value (Pr > F)      4.58 (0.0108)  5.29 (0.0054) 
 
Notes: 
1. All the regressions include a dummy variable for each year and for each province. 
2. Year 1994 = 1 if year < 1994; 0 otherwise. 
3. t-values are in the parentheses.  The stars 
*, 
** and 
*** indicate significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. 
4. “FDI”: 1,000 US dollars per worker.  “College graduates”: the proportion of population who have 
college degrees or above.  “Capital Vintage”: double difference of log Capital.  “Human capital spillover” 
variable is defined in the text.  All the monetary values were deflated with the base of Beijing 1990. 
5. In the 2SLS, the market economy variable and its interaction term with “Year 1994” are used as 
instrumental variables.     36
 
Table 5 
TFP growth regression, 1987-2003 
 
  Two-Way FE   Two-Way FE + 2SLS 
Dependent variable: log(TFPt) –  
log(TFPt-1) 
(1) 
 
Scale 
Unconstrained 
(2) 
Scale 
Constrained to 
CRS 
(3) 
 
Scale 
Unconstrained 
(4) 
Scale 
Constrained to 
CRS 
Intercept  -0.025 -0.037 -0.042  -0.060
** 
   (-1.02)   (-1.65)  (-1.52)  (-2.36) 
FDIt-2  -0.021 0.042 0.059  0.0045 
    (-0.41) (0.89) (0.38) (0.03) 
FDIt-2 * Year 1994  0.51
** 0.38  1.92
*** 1.69
*** 
   (1.99)  (1.59) (2.95) (2.82) 
College graduates t-1  0.18  0.077 0.55 0.28 
   (0.79)  (0.37) (1.64) (0.91) 
Human capital spillover t-1 0.32
** 0.43
*** 0.33
** 0.38
*** 
   (2.34)  (3.38) (2.07) (2.64) 
Human capital spillover t-1 * Year 1994  0.40
** 0.28
* 0.57
*** 0.52
*** 
   (2.36)  (1.79) (2.66) (2.64) 
Capital Vintage t 0.49
*** 0.42
*** 0.49
*** 0.39
*** 
   (4.13)  (3.82) (3.84) (3.33) 
Telephones t-1 0.24
*** 0.25
*** 0.17  0.30
* 
   (2.93)  (3.24) (0.98) (1.85) 
Roads t-1  0.018 -0.015  -0.0035 -0.011 
   (0.57)   (-0.50)  (-0.08)  (-0.26) 
Roads t-1 * Year 1994  0.093
*** 0.12
*** 0.012 0.028 
   (2.64)  (3.57) (0.22) (0.58) 
 
N  459 459 459 459 
R  square  0.98  0.62   
F-statistics  513.21 13.02  474.67 12.22 
F Test for No Fixed Effects: F Value 
(Pr > F) 
521.93 
(<.0001) 13.03  (<.0001) 
482.33   
(0.0001) 12.19  (0.0001) 
Hausman Test for Endogeneity: F 
Value (Pr > F)      3.08 (0.0472)  3.55 (0.0297) 
Notes: 
1. All the regressions include a dummy variable for each year and for each province. 
2. Year 1994 = 1 if year < 1994; 0 otherwise. 
3. t-values are in the parentheses.  The stars 
*, 
** and 
*** indicate significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. 
4. “FDI”: 1,000 US dollars per worker.  “College graduates”: the proportion of population who have 
college degrees or above.  “Capital Vintage”: double difference of log Capital.  “Telephone”: number of 
units per person.  “Road”: km per km
2.  “Human capital spillover” variable is defined in the text.  All the 
monetary values were deflated with the base of Beijing 1990. 
5. In the 2SLS, the market economy variable and its interaction term with “Year 1994” are used as 
instrumental variables.   
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Table 6 
Internal Rates of Return to Investment in Education and Telephone Infrastructure 
 
Province 
(1) 
Direct contribution 
to production 
though secondary 
education 
(2) 
Indirect contribution 
to production 
though higher 
education 
(3) 
Telephone 
Beijing 0.2384  0.1403  0.6988 
Tianjin 0.4700  0.2217  0.7843  
Hebei 0.5510  0.3744  0.5295  
Shanxi 0.5054  0.4173  0.4719  
Liaoning 0.4811  0.2786  0.6360  
Jilin 0.4942  0.3325  0.5419  
Heilongjiang 0.5786  0.3151  0.5351  
Shanghai 0.4289    0.9241  
Jiangsu 0.5547  0.4434  0.6576  
Zhejiang 0.4647  0.4259  0.6698  
Anhui 0.4682  0.4677  0.4200  
Fujian 0.6142  0.2679  0.5947  
Jiangxi 0.5178  0.4638  0.4226  
Shandong 0.5668  0.3324  0.6332  
Henan 0.5726  0.4580  0.4089  
Hubei 0.5162  0.3262  0.4762  
Hunan 0.4684  0.4111  0.4355  
Guangxi 0.4882  0.3140  0.4181  
Sichuan 0.5094  0.2974  0.4200  
Guizhou 0.4087  0.3417  0.2769  
Yunnan 0.5849  0.2516  0.3492  
Shaanxi 0.4326  0.3818  0.3810  
Gansu 0.4632  0.3111  0.3536  
Qinghai 0.5137  0.2786  0.4134  
Ningxia 0.4706  0.3087  0.4033  
Xinjiang 0.4944  0.2467  0.4504  
Guangdong 0.5503  0.2307  0.6099 
Coastal 0.4932 0.3046 0.6780  
Northeast 0.5180 0.3087 0.5710  
Far West  0.4855 0.2863 0.4052  
Interior   0.4975 0.3755 0.4073  
National 0.4966 0.3323 0.5154  
Note: 
1. Production function: 2-way FE, 2 periods, CRS. 
2. The computation of rates of return (
s
i ρ ) are discussed in Appendix A-C.   
3. Regional calculations are arithmetic means of the constituent provinces.   38
 
 
Table 7 
Impact on Regional Ratios of Per-Capita GDP under Alternative Hypothetical 
Policy Scenarios in 2013 
 
  NE/Coastal FW/Coastal Interior  /Coastal 
Secondary Education (Direct Contribution) 
Increase compared to No Policy 
% of Increase in the Ratios 
1.0147 
0.1343 
15.25% 
0.4521 
0.0903 
24.96% 
0.4999 
0.0993 
24.79% 
College Education (Indirect Contribution) 
Increase compared to No Policy 
% of Increase in the Ratios 
0.9061 
0.0257 
2.92% 
0.3872 
0.0254 
7.02% 
0.4626 
0.0620 
15.48% 
Telephones  
Increase compared to No Policy 
% of Increase in the Ratios 
1.1737 
0.2933 
33.31% 
0.4823 
0.1205 
33.31% 
0.5341 
0.1335 
33.33% 
 
Predicted ratios without any policy imposed  0.8804  0.3618  0.4006 
 
Note: The details about the alternative hypothetical policy are provided in Appendix D. 
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Figure 1 Coefficient of Variation Nominal GDP per Capita (4 regions) 
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Figure 2 Real Per Capita GDP Ratios  
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Figure 3 Marginal Product of Labor  
(Two Categories of Labor, 2-Way FE with CRS)  
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Figure 4 Marginal Product of Capital  
(Two categories of Labor, 2-Way FE with CRS) 
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 Figure 5 Total Factor Productivity Growth  
(Two categories of Labor, 2-Way FE, with CRS) 
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Appendix 
 
Production Function: 
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ββ ββ
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TFP Growth Equation: 
, , 11 ,2 ,1 , 2 2 , 2 1 , 1
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[log log ] _
11
[( ) ] [( ) ] _
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ti t ti t ss
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ii t ii t
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yy yy
hh Y B
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−− −−
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A. The Rate of Return to Education Based on Its Direct Effect 
 
Basic Assumptions: 
o  Policy scenario: each provincial government is going to invest in education by 
sending less-educated workers to receive high school education.  In order to 
maintain the same ratio of college graduates to high-school graduates in the 
population, some of the workers will continue their studies at college.  The 
lengths of the high school education and the college education are assumed to be 
three years and four years, respectively.  After the graduation, the workers will be 
sent to work for N2 years (starting at time t+1). 
,1 ,2
,1 ,2
...
...
ie i t e i t
ni t ni t
dL dL dL
dL dL
++
++
===
=− =− =
 
Let xi be the proportion of workers who have college degrees in province i in 
2003.  Under this policy, there will be  ii x dL ⋅  number of workers to receive both 
high school and college education, and (1 ) ii x dL − ⋅  number of workers to receive 
only high school education. 
o  Before imposing the policy, assume all the variables stay constant in projecting 
the future output, which is growing at the annual rate of  i w . 
,2003 ,2002 log log ii i wT F P T F P =− 
Other variables:   ,1 ,2 ... ei ei t ei t LL L ++ = ==  
  ,1 ,2 ... ni ni t ni t LL L ++ = ==  
o  The current time t = 2003, and YB = 0 after time t. 
 
Return to Education Based on Its Direct Effect: 
,, 1 log log it j it j i YY w ++ − −= ,    1 j ≥  
,, , , log log log log it j it i it i it i Y Y jw Y jw Y jw + =+ ⋅ =+ ⋅ =+ ⋅   
   45
Let  , ji i j w ϒ=⋅ 
Then, 
,
,,
j i
it j it YY e
ϒ
+ =  
 
Return to education at time t+j: 
,
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,,,
ji ji ji ji
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i t je e i t jn n i t je in i
ei ni ei ni
Ye Ye Ye Ye
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LL L L
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Total return to education (from year t+1 to year t+N2): 
, 2
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1
Return ( )
(1 )
ji N
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Investment Cost: 
The cost of investment per year: 
  Direct cost:     Di 
 Indirection  cost: 
,,
,,
it it
n
ni t ni t
YY
LL
β
∂
=
∂
 
 Total  cost: 
, ()
it
ii n
ni
Y
dL D
L
β ⋅+  
 
Assume the unit costs of high school education and college education are 
, ()
it h
ii n
ni
Y
dL D
L
β ⋅+  and 
, ()
it c
ii n
ni
Y
dL D
L
β ⋅+ , respectively.  The length of high school 
education is N1h -year, and the length of college education is N1c -year. 
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The Rate of Return (
s
i ρ ) to Education Based on Its Direct Effect:   46
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B. The Rate of Return to Education Based on Its Indirect Effect 
 
Basic Assumptions: 
o  Policy scenario: each provincial government is going to invest in education by 
sending workers with high school diplomas to receive college education.  The 
length of the college education is assumed to N1 (=4) years.  After the graduation, 
the workers will be sent to work for N2 years (starting at time t+1, with constant 
population  i Pop ). 
,1 ,2 ... ii t i t dh dh dh ++ ===  
o  Before imposing the policy, assume all the variables stay constant in projecting 
the future output, which is growing at the annual rate of  i w . 
,2003 ,2002 log log ii i wT F P T F P =− 
Other variables:   ,1 ,2 ... ei ei t ei t LL L ++ = ==  
  ,1 ,2 ... ni ni t ni t LL L ++ = ==  
  ,1 ,2 ... ii t i t Pop Pop Pop ++ = ==  
o  Let E be the proportion of workers with college degrees.  Due to the lack of data, 
we assume that the proportion of workers with college degrees (Ei) is equal to the 
proportion of people with college degrees (hi) before the policy imposed. 
Since  ii dE dh =  and  ,1 ,2 ... ii t i t dE dE dE ++ = == , 
  ,1 ,2 ... ii t i t dh dh dh ++ ===  
o  The current time t = 2003, and YB = 0 after time t. 
 
 
Return to Education Based on Its Indirect Effect: 
 
Based on the TFP Growth Equation, 
max, 1 , 1
,2 ,1 ,1 1 1
max_ , 1
max, ,
,1 ,1 1 1
max_ ,
1
log log { [ ( )]}
1
log { [ ( )]}
ti t hs
it it it
ii t
ti t hs
it it
ii t
yy
TFP TFP h other variables
dy
yy
TFP h other variables
dy
φφ
φφ
++
++ +
+
++
−
=+ ⋅ + +
−
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Let 
max, ,
11
max_ ,
1
[( ) ]
ti t hs
i
ii t
yy
dy
ϑφφ
−
=+  
Then,  ,2 ,1 ,1 log log it it it i TFP TFP h other variables ϑ ++ + =+ ⋅ +  
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Note: Other variables are not the functions of h.  Although h is increased at time t+1, 
there are no impacts on  ,1 it TFP +  due to the assumption of the lagged impact of h. 
 
Return to education at time t+2: 
2, ,2 ,2 ,2 ,2 ,2
,2 ,
,1 ,2 ,2 ,1 ,1
log log log
log log
i it it it it it
it it i
it it it it it
d Y d Y dY dT F P dT F P
YY e
d h dYdT F P d h d h
ϑ
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2, 2,
,2 , ,1 ,
ii
it it i it it i i d Y Ye d h Ye d h ϑϑ
ϒϒ
++ =⋅ ⋅ =⋅ ⋅  
 
Return to education at time t+3: 
3,
,3 , 2
i
it it i i dY Y e dh ϑ
ϒ
+ =⋅ ⋅  
 
Return to education at time t+j ( 2 j ≥ ): 
,
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Total return to education (from year t+1 to year t+N2): 
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Investment Cost: 
The cost of investment per year:  
  Direct cost:     Di 
 Indirection  cost 
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 Total  cost: 
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Assume the government pays 
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β ⋅⋅ +  each year until the workers 
finish their N1-year college education at time t. 
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The Rate of Return (
s
i ρ ) to Education Based on Its Indirect Effect: 
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The estimates of D (Direct Cost) 
 
Direct cost = total expenditures/ total number of students 
 
Unit: 100,000,000 yuan / 10,000 persons 
 
Table I 
 
Year: 2002  Higher Education  High School 
Beijing 2.8116  0.5149 
Tianjin 1.2546  0.3945 
Hebei 0.5967  0.1593 
Shanxi 0.6901  0.1753 
Liaoning 0.9439  0.2324 
Jilin 0.9738  0.2197 
Heilongjiang 0.8082  0.1367 
Shanghai 1.7431  0.4931 
Jiangsu 1.0842  0.3081 
Zhejiang 1.1719  0.3765 
Anhui 0.8645  0.1936 
Fujian 1.0761  0.2074 
Jiangxi 0.6734  0.1435 
Shandong 0.8363  0.2148 
Henan 0.5285  0.1157 
Hubei 1.0849  0.1880 
Hunan 0.8072  0.1850 
Guangxi 0.8064  0.1804 
Sichuan 1.0213  0.1776 
Guizhou 0.6730  0.1278 
Yunnan 0.7701  0.1881 
Shaanxi 0.9156  0.0936 
Gansu 0.8995  0.1421 
Qinghai 0.8827  0.1608 
Ningxia 0.8478  0.1394 
Xinjiang 0.6211  0.1664 
Guangdong 1.2340  0.2946 
 
Notes: 
1. All the data were collected from the 2003 Education Statistical Yearbook.   
2. The total expenditure data are deflated using GDP deflator (base = Beijing, 1990). 
3. Hainan is included in Guangdong; Chongqing is included in Sichuan.   
 
 
 
C. The Rate of Return to Infrastructure Measures 
 
Basic Assumptions: 
o  Policy scenario: each provincial government is going to invest C dollars on 
infrastructure at time t.  The newly increased infrastructure will be available at the   49
beginning of time t+1.  The rate of return is computed based on the service 
provided by the newly increased infrastructure during the time between t+1 and 
t+N2. 
1
, (1 )
j
it j i dTel R dTel
−
+ =− ,   2 j ≥  
1
, (1 )
j
it j i dRoad R dRoad
−
+ =− ,   2 j ≥  
o  Before imposing the policy, assume all the variables stay constant in projecting 
the future output, which is growing at the annual rate of  i w  
,2003 ,2002 log log ii i wT F P T F P =− 
o  Depreciation ratio, R = 0.06.  The initial stock of infrastructure (at time t) is 
assumed to be maintained at the same level throughout the years.  The 
depreciation is only applied to the newly increased infrastructure (starting at t+2). 
o  The current time t = 2003, and YB = 0 after time t. 
 
  
 
Telephone Infrastructure 
 
Based on the TFP Growth Equation, 
,2 ,1 1 ,1 log log
t
it it it TFP TFP Tel other variables β ++ + =+ +  
Note: Other variables are not the functions of Tel.  Although Tel is increased at time t+1, 
there are no impacts on  ,1 it TFP +  due to the assumption of the lagged impact of Tel. 
 
 
Return to telephone infrastructure at time t+2: 
2, 2,
, 2 ,1 , 1 ,1
ii tt
it it it it i dY Y e dTel Y e dTel ββ
ϒϒ
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Return to telephone infrastructure at time t+3: 
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Return to Road Construction at time t+j ( 2 j ≥ ): 
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Total return to road (from year t+1 to year t+N2): 
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Investment Cost: 
Let 
t
i C  be the unit cost of telephone in Province i.   50
Then, the investment cost is: 
t
ii i dTel Pop C ⋅ ⋅  
 
The Rate of Return (
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i ρ ) to Telephone Infrastructure: 
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Cost estimates for the telephone 
 
The CSY reports the aggregate investment cost for "Transportation, Storage, Postal and 
Telecommunication Services," and there is no simple way to separate telecommunication 
investment from transportation.  In order to estimate the cost of telecommunication, we 
run a simple regression model with the dependent variable defined as average annual 
investment on transportation, storage, postal and telecommunication services between 
2001 and 2002 (per 100 million yuan).  The independent variables are (the data on 
storage facility are not available): 
avg_road_01_02: average annual road construction between 2001 and 2002 (per 
1,000 km). 
avg_telephone_01_02: average annual number of telephones increased between 2001 
and 2002 (per 10,000 unit). 
 
In this case, we can estimate the marginal cost of telecommunication infrastructure, while 
telephone ownership is used as a proxy for such infrastructure.  We assume that the 
average cost is constant and thus equals marginal cost.  The regression results are 
reported in Table II below.  All the monetary values were deflated using the price index 
of investment (Base = Beijing, 1990) 
 
Table II 
 
Regressor Coefficient  Std  Error t-statistc  p-value 
Intercept 9.67 15.84 0.61  0.55 
avg_road_01_02 0.39 1.12 0.35  0.73 
avg_telephone_01_02 0.81 0.11 7.15  <.0001 
 
R-square: 0.6827 
Notes: 
1. Hainan is included in Guangdong; and Chongqing is included in Sichuan.  Tibet and Inner Mongolia are 
excluded for lack of continuous data. 
2. We would like to use more recent data to estimate the costs for road construction and telephone.  
However, the telecommunication services are no longer grouped with transportation, storage and postal 
since 2003. 
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D. Impact on Regional Ratios of Per-Capita GDP under Alternative Hypothetical 
Policy Scenarios in 2013 
 
Basic Assumptions: 
o  Policy scenario: the central government is going to invest in human capital or 
telecommunication infrastructure in the northeast, far west and interior regions, in 
order to reduce the regional per-capita output gaps. The total amount of 
investment is assumed to be 10% of the central government total revenue every 
year for 5 years.  The fund is distributed to the provinces in those non-coastal 
regions, weighed by population size of the province.
31 
o  The first investment project is assumed to be completed at the beginning of 2004, 
and the last investment project is assumed to be completed at the beginning of 
2008.  For simplicity, the increases in the levels of human capital and 
infrastructure from each investment project are assumed to be the same.  The 
impacts of those investment projects on regional inequality are evaluated at the 
end of the 10th year (2013).   
o  There are two channels through which human capital can influence output: the 
direct contribution to production and the indirect contribution through the TFP 
growth on production.  For the direct contribution, each non-coastal provincial 
government sends workers to receive high school education (some of them will 
continue their education at college in order to maintain the same ratios of college 
graduates to high-school graduates as in 2003).  For the indirect contribution, each 
non-coastal provincial government sends workers with high school education to 
receive college education.  The lengths of high school and college education are 
assumed to be 3-year and 4-year, respectively.   
o  The infrastructure construction is assumed to be completed in 1 year.  
Depreciation ratio, R = 0.06.  The initial stock of infrastructure (in 2003) is 
assumed to be maintained at the same level throughout the years.  The 
depreciation is only applied to the newly increased infrastructure (starting in 
2005). 
o  We assume  ,1 , ,1 , log log log log it it it it i YY T F PT F P w ++ −= − =  before imposing the policy.  
wi is a provincial constant, which is set to be  ,2003 ,2002 log log ii TFP TFP − .  For 
simplicity, we assume  max i
i
yy
y
− stays constant after the policy imposed. 
 
Direct Contribution of Human Capital:  
Let gi be the increase in the number of workers with at least secondary high school 
degrees from each investment project. 
t = 2004:  ei L Æ ei i Lg +   ni L Æ 5 ni i Lg − ⋅  
M 
t ≥ 2008:  ei L Æ 5 ei i Lg +⋅   ni L Æ 5 ni i Lg − ⋅  
 
                                                 
31 The total government revenue is 2171.525 billion yuan in 2003.  We assume that the total cost of each 
investment project is the same and equal to 2171.525 billion yuan.   52
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Indirect Contribution of Human Capital: 
Let gi be the increase in the number of workers with college degrees from each 
investment project.  The first investment project is completed at the beginning of 2004, 
but the growth rate of TFP will not be affected until in 2005 due to the assumption of the 
lagged impact.  Due to the lack of data, we assume that the proportion of workers with 
college degrees is equal to the proportion of people with college degrees before the policy 
imposed.  Let  ci L denote the original number of workers with college degrees. 
t = 2004:  ei L Æ 4 ei i Lg −⋅   ci L Æ ci i Lg +  
t = 2005:  ei L Æ 3 ei i Lg −⋅   ci L Æ 2 ci i Lg + ⋅  
M 
t ≥ 2008:  ei L Æ ei L    ci L Æ 5 ci i Lg + ⋅  
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Telephones: 
Let gi be the increase in the number of telephones from each investment project.  The first 
investment project is completed at the beginning of 2004, but the growth rate of TFP will 
not be affected until in 2005 due to the assumption of the lagged impact.      
t = 2004:  i Tel Æ ii Tel g +  
t = 2005:  i Tel Æ 2 ii Tel g +⋅  
M 
t ≥ 2008:  i Tel Æ 5 ii Tel g +⋅  
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Denote z as follows: 
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